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FROM DRAGONS TO DWARFS: REEXAMINING NEO-LIBERAL 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS1
 
 
Rajah Rasiah2
 
Abstract 
 
The Asian dragon economies, which were considered models for development lessons 
for around a decade suddenly crashed following the rupture of the Thai baht in 1997. 
The alarming collapse of these economies has led to a search for answers not only by the 
economies gripped by the crisis, but also others learning from them. Malaysia has 
managed to avoid a catastrophic destruction of its engines of growth through largely its 
positive overall balances that prevented a forced recourse to external assistance, while 
Indonesia and Thailand had to seek IMF help. Despite the resumption of economic 
growth, uncertainties still loom over these economies. Efforts to conceptualize the future 
development of the region inevitably require a profound understanding of the dynamics 
of both national and international forces behind the crisis. This paper argues that neo-
liberal prescriptions were at the heart of the Southeast Asian financial crisis. 
Government interventions generally either favored or blended with private interests 
demonstrating the skewed nature of market manifestations. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The debate on suitable economic regimes for growth has re-emerged again in the wake 
of the Asian financial disaster. Despite the pervasive nature of state intervention behind 
the success of the Northeast Asian economies (see Deyo, 1995; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 
1990; Chang, 1994; Rasiah, 1998), neo-liberal analyses for long either presented it as 
market-conforming or mutually cancelling distortions that did not seriously affect 
growth (see Bhagwati, 1988; Balassa, 1988). The World Bank (1993) made a substantial 
shift in incorporating the endless stream of works contesting neo-liberal explanations of 
East Asian growth by acknowledging interventions in Northeast Asia but considered 
them as less useful for lessons than the experience of Southeast Asia, which was argued 
to be liberal and hence more suitable for the deregulating currents of globalization. 
Hence, global institutions such as the World Bank and IMF recommended South 
American, African, South and West Asian, and the transitional economies to learn from 
the miraculous growth experience of these economies. The standard prescription was to 
 
1 This paper was presented at a DIR seminar at Aalborg University: Assessing the Recovery Plans of Asian Economies 
Destabilized by Financial Crisis. Valuable comments are acknowledged from Stanislav Menchikov, Jacques Hersh, and 
Johannes Schmidt, although the argument remains the responsibility of the author. 
2 Professor of Business Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak.  
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deregulate and export. Some went as far as to picture their growth experience as being 
the result of falling levels of distortions and corruption.3
 
As the ensuing regional contagion swept across these nations bankrupting thousands of 
firms and making millions jobless, neo-liberal arguments have changed their story to 
explain the failure of these economies as being caused by state intervention, cronyism 
and corruption.4 Strangely what was considered the basis of Southeast Asian growth – 
i.e., liberalization especially since the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s - seem to be 
ignored now.  The unquestioning support for the paradigm of free markets has prevented 
a serious reassessment of neo-liberal conjectures epistemologically. The very spirit of 
intellectual discourse – subjecting propositions continuously to new evidence 
scientifically – seems to have taken a back seat.  
 
This essay attempts to examine the causes of the financial crisis in the context of 
government-market failures with specific attention to challenging neo-liberal 
contentions of growth and crash involving the Southeast Asian second-tier Newly 
Industrializing Economies (NIEs). The paper argues that while Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand were already poised to slow down from the mid-1990s because 
of the lack of institutional development to sustain long term growth, the suddenness of 
the crash was a direct result of liberal capital and currency markets.  
 
LIBERALIZING CURRENTS  
Global markets have become increasingly liberal since the 1970s following the 
dismantling of the fixed exchange rate mechanism. Orthodox neo-liberal policies began 
to unfold dramatically following the decline of Keynesianism, which began to 
breakdown in the welfare states of developed economies since the end of the 1960s. The 
golden age of economic growth, beginning after 1945 reached its limits when both 
inflation and unemployment began to rise.5 The spread of neo-liberal ideology 
influenced the liberalization of economic institutions across the globe. The pervasive 
promotion of free currency and capital markets has sucked in individuals, institutions 
and economies in the international economy under conditions of increasingly weakening 
social bonds. Social welfare goals have been increasingly compromised as liberalism 
unfolded from the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
The collapse of the fixed exchange rates mechanism in 1971 and its subsequent impact 
on exchange rates and international reserves sent the first destabilizing waves in 
financial markets. The United States was not only able to deflate its real international 
payment commitments denominated in US dollars owing to its fallen value, but was also 
 
3 See for example Lee (1993). 
4 See for example Hughes (1998); Friedman (1997). 
5 Samuelson and Solow had found evidence to support the Phillip’s curve which posits an inverse relationship between 
inflation and unemployment using the experience of developed economies. 
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able to use its huge domestic financial market to enjoy scale advantages over other 
economies. With the rise of monetarism across the world as economies attempted to 
balance their budgets by slashing government expenditure, the welfare state began to 
crumble across Europe since the 1970s. Even with better legal frameworks and public 
accountability, developed economies’ institutions increasingly became slanted towards 
liberalism. Developing economies lacking institutional development became 
substantially more vulnerable to the forces of liberalization.  
 
Increasing liberalization of currency and capital markets began to expand the volume of 
currency transactions unrelated to trade. The quantum expansion in portfolio equity 
investment across the globe increased the vulnerability of small open economies. Annual 
exports and currency transactions in the world exceeded US$1.3 trillion and US$4.6 
trillion respectively in 1977, rising to US$4.8 trillion and US$325 trillion respectively in 
1995 (Korten, cited from Khor 1997: 15). In other words transactions unrelated to trade 
had expanded from 78.1 per cent in 1977 to 98.5 per cent in 1995. The alarming 
expansion in currency transactions unrelated to international trade deepened systemic 
risks facing open developing economies in the international economy. Small open 
economies such as the Southeast Asian second tier NIEs capital and currency markets 
became increasingly susceptible to the destabilizing effects of sudden capital flights, 
whether driven by actual economic fundamentals or predatory behavior by speculators. 
Keynes had warned against such unproductive and harmful conduct and hence called for 
controls when the Bretton Woods institutions were formulated in 1944. 
 
The continued stagnation of the developed economies of the United States and Western 
Europe in the 1980s when faced with a massive inflow of liquidity arising initially from 
petrodollars that multiplied following the second oil crisis of 1979-80, found a haven in 
developing economies enjoying strong macroeconomic foundations. The aggressive 
promotion of stock markets led to the opening and strengthening of stock markets in 
developing economies. Hence, the surplus cash in the developed economies found a vent 
in the NIEs – first, second and third tiers. From negligible in the 1970s, portfolio equity 
flows to developing economies expanded from the mid-1980s (see Tables 1 and 2). The 
collapse of the socialist experiment amplified such flows as neo-liberal orthodoxy saw 
equity flows as the best mechanism to shape resource allocation – that individual 
investors with less influence on markets – would enter and exit firms based on their 
performance record. Hence, stock markets grew strongly in the 1990s, including in the 
transitional economies. Although portfolio equity inflows still constituted less than a 
third of FDI inflows to developing economies, its rapid rate of expansion brought wide 
ramifications for capital volatility. As a proportion of GNP, portfolio equity capital6 rose 
from 0.00 percent in 1975-82 to 0.02 per cent in 1983-89 and 0.54 per cent in 1990-98, 
overtaking the contribution of bonds and long-term bank credit (see Table 1). Net 
 
6 The World Bank defined portfolio equity flows to include national savings, deposit receipts and direct stock purchases by 
foreign investors. 
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portfolio equity and related flows in overall capital flows to developing markets rose 
from 4.4 per cent in 1988 to 20.1 per cent in 1991 and 41.5 per cent in 1993 before 
falling to 26.9 per cent in 1995 (see Table 2). The commensurate flows to Asia rose 
from 3.8 per cent in 1987 to 15.2 per cent in 1989, 33 per cent in 1993 before falling to 
24.1 per cent in 1995.  
 
 
Table 1: Private Capital Inflows to Developing Economies in GNP, 1975-98 (%) 
 1975-82 1983-89 1990-98 
Private Inflows 3.33 1.29 3.97 
  Non-debt Creating 
Inflows 
0.42 0.55 2.21 
       FDI 0.42 0.53 1.67 
       Portfolio Equity 0.00 0.02 0.54 
Bonds 0.11 0.05 0.52 
Bank Credit 2.46 0.44 1.17 
       Short-term  1.10 0.10 0.72 
       Long-term 1.36 0.34 0.44 
Source: Extracted from Akuyz and Cornford (2000: Table 1); compiled from estimates 
of UNCTAD Secretariat and World Bank (1999). 
 
 
With the Plaza Accord forcing capital outflows from Northeast Asia and Singapore 
following the floating of their currencies and the subsequent withdrawal of the 
Generalized System of Preferences from the Asian NIEs, Southeast Asian economies 
became a major target of foreign capital inflows from the mid-1980s. The governments 
of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand aggressively attracted capital 
inflows – both FDI and portfolio equity capital – using extremely generous ownership 
conditions and fiscal incentives (see Rasiah, 1998). In the absence of effective 
governance to ensure socially acceptable investment flows, quick profits drove hot 
capital flows across Southeast Asia as governments increasingly opened their economies 
for them. Indeed, portfolio capital and related flows to developing economies expanded 
sharply from the late 1980s (see Table 2). 
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Table 2: Net Portfolio Equity Capital and Related Flows to Developing Economies, 
1986-1995 
 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Developing 
Markets 
  4.7   3.0   4.4 10.4   9.4 20.1 19.4 41.5 34.7 26.9 
Asia   4.8   3.8   5.2 15.2   9.5 13.7 11.7 33 31.9 24.1 
Africa dan 
Middle 
East 
  0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0  2.0 16.5 43.3 
Latin 
America 
  0.0   0.9   1.8   4.9 11.0 29.5 31.7 58.7 40.2 21.9 
Eastern 
Europe and 
Central 
Asia 
   0.0 76 53.4 67.5 62.6 24.3 67.7 81.2 76.8 
 
Source: UNCTAD (1988) 
 
The explosive growth in stock markets took place at a time when the Southeast Asian 
economies were rapidly deregulating to meet global trading arrangements. Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand were faced with deregulation pressures in the 1990s as the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) liberalization processes were implemented. The 
Philippines had already deregulated extensively following the imposition of the IMF-led 
structural adjustment package in 1984 (Ofreneo, 1998).  
 
Attracted by rising rentier opportunities from rapid growth, the political regimes in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand focused on the short-term benefits of 
liberalization (see Jomo et al, 1996; Rasiah, 1998). Liberalization without adequate 
installation of effective governance instruments began to expose the East Asian 
economies to external volatilities. The dangers of unfettered deregulation began to 
emerge strongly as resource and factor limits were stretched. Indonesia, Thailand and 
the Philippines in particular were already building up unsustainable short-term debt 
problems. The Philippines and Thailand were in addition gripped by chronic current 
account deficits.  
 
While the overwhelming blowout of the affected economies were a result of a sudden 
loss in confidence which drove away investors and savers to exit liberal domestic 
markets and financial institutions causing panic-ridden herd behavior, these economies 
had reached crisis proportions as a consequence of debt-driven growth. The exit of such 
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a massive amount of capital suddenly, seriously affected exchange rates, interest rates 
and asset-liability ratios. The ensuing free fall crippled economic transactions, whether 
driven by good economic fundamentals or otherwise.  
 
The experiences of the individual economies were different. Thailand, Malaysia and the 
Philippines were already affected by a severe worsening of their current account deficits. 
The commensurate deficits in Indonesia were not as severe. Thailand, the Philippines 
and Indonesia faced a sharp aggravation of short-term debt problems. Thailand, the 
Philippines and Indonesia were not able to pay their international commitments (debt 
service and current account commitments) when the loss in confidence exhausted their 
capacity to borrow. These economies had to go to the IMF as lender of last resort. 
Malaysia did not face such a situation owing to its relative surplus of international 
reserves and hence enjoyed the freedom to experiment with policies unconditioned by 
the IMF.  
 
Rapid growth since 1987 helped build international confidence which came along with 
equity investments. The macroeconomic variables of East and Southeast Asia improved 
considerably (see Table 3). The whole regional stock market(s) began to expand with its 
peak in 1993 and its subsequent decline was too gentle to suggest a crash was around the 
corner (See Table 4). The continued growth of the real economy, despite narrowly 
defined structural change and massive physical expansion attracted international 
investment. The huge build up in trade surpluses in Japan in the face of its ailing 
domestic economy and low interest rates drove significant outflows to Southeast Asia. 
Japanese investment also expanded into property development – from hotels to malls. 
Despite the build up of systemic risks in particular in South Korea and Thailand where 
the short-term debt commitments and current account deficits as a share of international 
reserves had soared to unserviceable limits, international investors continued to flow 
into these economies because of the almost mytical categorization of the East Asian 
economies.7 In Thailand, the expansion in unhedged loans from abroad supporting 
growth in the real estate and property sectors due to asset inflation became unsustainable 
when the bubble burst. Private interests driven by short-term profit making motives 
expanded their operations in these sectors. 
 
Stock markets received greater emphasis than social welfare. Irrespective of their 
origination, stock market capitalization was supported strongly by all four Southeast 
Asian governments without much concern for effective corporate governance. 
Privatization in the Southeast Asian second-tier NIEs saw the colossal transfer of 
ownership of public institutions to private interests. Stock market capitalization of 
 
7 Data on the catastrophic developments in these economies are published annually by the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) in Switzerland, and UNCTAD (1996) published its first systematic account of its dangers in its 1996 Trade and 
Development report. 
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privatized public institutions were handled to favor dominant interests as preferential 
shares and participation in privileged projects – involving especially governments - were 
favorably awarded to the politically connected (see Gomez and Jomo, 1997).8  
 
Table 3: Macroeconomic Statistics of East Asia, 1990-98 
GDP Growth Rate Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate#  
90-95 96 97 90-95 96 97 90 96 98
Indonesia 8.0 7.8 4.9 8.7 7.9 6.6 - 4.1 9-12
Malaysia 8.9 8.6 7.7 3.7 3.5 4.0 6.0 2.5 3.2
China 10.7 9.6 8.8 11.3 8.3 2.8 - 3.0 5-6
Philippines 2.3 5.8 5.2 10.6 9.1 6.0 - 7.4 13.1
Singapore 8.6 6.9 7.8 2.7 1.4 2.0 - 1.8 4.5
South 
Korea 
7.8 7.1 5.5 6.6 5.0 4.5 - 2.6 7.6
Taiwan 6.4 5.7 6.8 3.8 3.1 0.9 - - -
Thailand 9.0 5.5 -0.4 5.0 5.9 5.6 - 1.1 4.4
Savings/GDP Investment/GDP (Savings-Investment)/GDP  
90-95 96 97 90-95 96 97 90-95 96 97
Indonesia 31.0 27.3 29.9 31.3 30.7 31.3 -0.3 -3.4 -1.4
Malaysia 36.6 42.6 43.8 37.5 41.5 42.0 -0.9 1.1 1.8
China 40.8 40.5 41.5 38.8 39.6 38.2 2.0 0.9 3.3
Philippines 16.6 18.5 20.3 22.4 23.1 23.8 -5.8 -5.3 -3.5
Singapore 47.0 51.2 51.8 34.9 35.3 37.4 12.1 15.9 14.4
South 
Korea 
35.6 33.7 33.1 36.8 38.4 35.0 -1.2 -4.7 -1.9
Taiwan 26.9 25.1 24.8 24.0 21.2 22.0 2.9 3.9 2.8
Thailand 34.4 33.7 32.9 41.0 41.7 35.0 -5.6 -8.0 -2.1
Incremental Capital-
Outpit Ratios* 
Fiscal balance/GDP Current Account/GDP  
87-89 90-92 93-95 90.95 96 97 90-95 96 97
Indonesia 4.0 3.9 4.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 -2.5 -3.4 -1.4
Malaysia 3.6 4.4 5.0 -0.4 0.7 1.8 -5.8 -5.0 -5.3
China - - - -1.0 -0.8 -0.7 1.2 0.9 3.2
Philippines 3.3 22.8 6.0 -1.1 0.3 0.1 -3.7 -4.7 -5.3
Singapore - - - 9.4 6.8 3.3 0.6 15.4 15.4
South 
Korea 
3.5 5.1 5.1 0.2 0.5 -1.4 -1.2 -4.7 -1.8
Taiwan - - - -5.0 -6.6 -6.3 4.2 4.0 2.7
Thailand 2.9 4.6 5.2 3.2 2.4 -0.9 -3.9 -7.9 -2.0
 
8 Information for Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia were obtained from private communications with Vorawidh C, Rene 
Ofreneo and Bomer Pasaribu respectively in 1998-99. 
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Source: * -Radelet and Sachs (1998:Table 11); Others from ADB (1999) 
 
The origin and spread of the crisis to Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines 
had much to do with their willful integration into an increasingly liberalizing 
international financial system. Despite the quasi peg, participants – individuals and 
institutions – enjoyed the freedom to purchase and sell huge amounts of cash without 
approval from the authorities in the crisis-affected economies. This freedom was often 
lauded as it offered the dominant interest groups the opportunity to transfer money 
instantly without public accountability. In Malaysia for example, until the rupture of the 
quasi peg, only single transactions exceeding RM20million required notification to the 
Central Bank. Along with exports and imports reaching between 100-180 percent of 
GDP, Indonesia’s, Malaysia’s, the Philippines’, and Thailand’s exposure to external 
capital movements had become extremely high. Clearly both the currency and capital 
markets in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand – all small and extremely 
open - were left seriously vulnerable when the baht crashed in July 1997. Once Thailand 
floated the baht following massive losses in international reserves from efforts to defend 
the currency from speculative attacks, it easily spread to the regional markets.  
 
The build up in short-term debt and current account deficits in Thailand, was clearly 
unsustainable at the time the baht fell though government finances was positive (see 
Tables 3 and 4). Indonesia’s current account was in surplus but its debt service had 
already become unsustainable. The Philippines had remained weak with economic 
fundamentals despite aggressive deregulation under an IMF-style structural adjustment 
package introduced since the mid-1980s. Despite its growing current account deficits, 
Malaysia’s international reserves still exceeded its international bills (current account 
deficits plus foreign debt service commitments) to prevent potential default and 
therefore did not warrant a collapse. The financial crisis ravaged all the four crisis-
affected economies causing chaos as the damage spread from currency and capital 
markets to their real economies. Driven by sentiments, large amounts of portfolio 
investment – both domestic and foreign – quickly exited Indonesia’s, Malaysia’s, the 
Philippines’ and Thailand’s stock markets. The bearish response dragged even savers – 
driven by panic and herd conduct - away from domestic banks who exchanged their 
money for foreign currencies, especially dollars to seek refuge in relatively safe havens.  
 
On 1 September 1998, the stock market composite indices in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, 
Jakarta and Manila contracted to 40.0, 24.4, 44.5 and 42.3 percent respectively of their 
values on 1 July 1997 (see Table 4). The contagion spread across East Asia as stock 
markets in Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and Seoul contracted to 71.2, 46.5, 42.8 and 
40.9 percent respectively in the same period. Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
shielded their currency and stock markets through tightening of corporate governance 
practices and instruments to prevent large scale movements of currencies unrelated to 
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trade. Governments in all these economies enjoyed considerable autonomy over 
dominant private interests to effect corporate governance. 
 
Table 4: Index of Main East and Southeast Asian Stock Markets, 1997-2000 
 
Index Peak July 1, 
1997 
September 1, 
1998 
January 1, 
1999 
June 30, 
1999 
February 18, 
2000 
Kuala 
Lumpur 
1332 1079 263 562 811 1013
Tokyo 38957 20176 14370 13416 17530 19789
Hong 
Kong 
16820 15197 7062 9809 13532 16599
Seoul 1145 758 310 588 883 879
Singapore 2190 1924 823 1400 2168 2177
Bangkok 1789 527 211 357 522 408
Jakarta 743 732 326 394 662 599
Manila 3448 2816 1192 1981 2487 1884
 
Source: NEAC-MTEN (1999); Sidhu (Star, February 21, 2000: 2). 
 
The sudden outflow of portfolio equity capital was one of the prime reasons for the 
aggravation of the equity-liability ratios, which expanded the non-payment loans (NPLs) 
in Southeast Asia. A sharp decline in sentiments affected capitalization of firms - both 
enjoying strong as well as weak financial fundamentals. Rising interest rates caused by a 
sharp fall in liquidity and the velocity of circulation in the face of falling East Asian 
demand crippled several firms. The exit of savings and portfolio capital abroad and into 
foreign currencies forced the baht, rupiah, ringgit and peso, to fluctuate downwards. The 
problem was worst when involving firms with liabilities in foreign currencies and 
receipts in domestic currencies. The initial adoption of contractionary policies – arising 
from tightening of credit and rising interest rates starved firms of much needed cash. 
Only export-oriented firms receiving payments in strong foreign currencies such as palm 
oil companies continued to enjoy strong growth. In addition, a significant amount of the 
ringgit, rupiah and baht sought refuge in Singapore’s offshore banks. 
 
The IMF added fuel to fire by prescribing neo-liberal policies calling for further 
deregulation, emphasizing the generation and dissemination of reliable data, closure of 
insolvent financial institutions and firms, removal of rigidities in the labor market, 
budget balancing to ameliorate the problems of rising risks, which included rising 
interest rates and tightening of collateral for loans. The contractionary policies 
debilitated demand and starved investment so much that a crippling crisis ensued as 
falling demand crushed the real sectors in all the economies. Only the foreign dominated 
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sectors and commodity export markets survived the credit crash? as the foreign 
exchange generated from exports helped them avoid the deflationary drop that was 
accelerating. Because Indonesia’s, the Philippines’ and Thailand’s international payables 
exceeded receivables and the fall in confidence stopped inflows of foreign exchange, 
their governments had to seek IMF aid. Malaysia did not face that situation and hence 
avoided similar consequences.  
 
Dominant private interests located in both developed and developing economies 
promoted risky channels of capital flows including the freedom to enter and exit 
suddenly for raising profit making opportunities rather than to ensure social stability. 
When the disastrous effects of the financial crisis spread across East Asia, the IMF 
merely used its standard neo-liberal diagnosis to solve the crisis. Hence, while Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hongkong reduced the damage by introducing shields in their currency 
and capital markets, IMF-advised economies got worse. As experts reviewed their 
conjectures again, it was clear that the crisis was turning back Keynes (1973) on his feet. 
The dangers of freeing both markets – capital and currency – as being dangerous and 
harmful for the real sectors had become increasingly obvious. As the individual 
economies were clearing the debris left behind by the crisis, the Southeast Asian 
blowout has raised serious doubts over neo-liberal calls for free global currency and 
capital markets.   
 
INCREASING SUPPORT FOR LIBERALIZATION DOMESTICALLY  
 
While Western governments and global institutions such as the IMF promoted free 
financial markets, Southeast Asian political regimes were also dramatically transferring 
public institutions to private ownership and readily deregulating their economies. 
Liberalization was not accompanied by effective development of legal and civil 
institutions to ensure public accountability. The unleashing of market forces in 
inherently imperfect underdeveloped locations – was both favored by dominant 
domestic interests as well as conditioned by international capital. While the 
internationally conditioning IMF rescue packages of Indonesia, the  Philippines and 
Thailand pushed for further deregulation, Malaysia’s capital controls only shielded 
currency and capital markets and to a large extent rescued the dominant private interests 
crippled by the financial crisis.  
 
While the stifling conditions imposed by the IMF to quicken further deregulation and 
shift private failures to governments has undermined domestic capitalist accumulation in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, capital controls in Malaysia appear to merely 
shield private interests that in the past had been promoted through liberalization. The 
basic framework of deregulation has remained in Malaysia despite controls to cushion 
the domestic economy from external volatility.  The regimes in Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia and the Philippines were not opposed to the fundamental prescriptions 
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interests of the IMF prior to the mid-1990s. In fact Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
were favored over South Korea and Taiwan for policy lessons by the World Bank (1993) 
due to their more liberal policies. Also, the ruling elites in these economies benefited 
and therefore supported the aggressive liberalization of their economies except that it 
was managed to also ensure continued creation of opportunities for rent capture.  
 
Privatization Driven by Patronage 
 
The prime domestic constraint Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand faced 
was a lack of instruments to filter harmful capital flows and transactions, including a 
lack of an early warning system to alert against systemic volatility from the external 
environment.  However, it took almost two months for the Thai storm to destabilise 
Indonesia and Malaysia. This time lag was more than sufficient to prevent excessive 
damage if only neo-liberal diagnoses had not prevailed at that time and governments had 
introduced instruments to prevent predatory conduct and panic from ruining both the 
capital and currency markets. Information and sufficiently equipped planes and pilots 
are critical to chart courses that help bypass strong winds. When planes still come 
against pounding winds because of information imperfections, adequately installed 
covers would help minimise damage.  
 
Liberalization premised on claims that government failures were inherently more serious 
than market failures has been driven by rhetoric rather than reality. Similarly extensive 
dirigisme calling for state intervention as the central basis of accumulation is also often 
fraught with failures. It is the recognition of both failures that has helped the building of 
effective government-market co-ordination to minimise the excesses of both in the 
successful reduction of its impact by Singapore and Taiwan. Privatization and state-
sponsored growth was promoted with considerable zeal prior to the crisis in Indonesia 
and Malaysia. Indirect features of industrial policy evolved in Thailand (see Jomo, 
1997). The Philippines lost their industrial policy strategies following the introduction of 
structural adjustment packages under the IMF since 1984. All four economies have 
retained their privatization processes after the financial crisis. Malaysia has continued 
with both policies even after the crisis. On the one hand heavy industries such as steel, 
automobiles and cement enjoy strong government support even when under private 
interests. On the other hand, the government has increased the pace of privatization of 
public utilities involving critical institutions.  
 
Consistent with neo-liberal prescriptions, stock markets were promoted aggressively by 
all the governments – both domestically and internationally – so that portfolio capital 
entered and exited capital markets with little restrictions prior to the crisis. As with FDI 
flows, governments guaranteed the free entry and exit of equity capital flows and stock 
market counters were expanded across the economies. The local media’s coverage 
presented a glowing account of the profiteering potential of investing in stock markets as 
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negative reports were carefully censored. The fairly stable exchange rate - albeit it rose 
gently because of its quasi peg with a basket of currencies – helped establish 
international confidence in the domestic stock market. Hence, both domestic and 
international investors flooded stock markets in all four economies. 
 
Financial markets in all four economies increasingly became open. Governments did not 
install filters to prevent the inflow of hot money, and sudden entry (entries?) and exits of 
portfolio equity capital. To woo FDI and portfolio capital, governments offered 
guarantees of free capital movement through investment guarantees that included the 
repatriation of profits. In Malaysia, individuals only had to notify Bank Negara when 
making cross border cash transactions exceeding RM20 million prior to the financial 
crisis. From virtually negligible participation in stock markets, foreign portfolio equity 
investment rose sharply from the mid-1980s, but its aggressive promotion without 
effective governance exposed these economies to considerable volatility (see Jomo, 
1998; Rasiah, 1998). In Malaysia for example, short selling was only suspended in 1997 
after the contagion had already penetrated the currency and stock markets. Hence, when 
sentiments crashed in 1997, substantial amounts of foreign portfolio capital left (see 
Table 4). 
 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand supported liberalization initiatives 
that expanded private ownership of economic resources. Ruling elites in these 
economies were indeed building their fortresses under similar but outmoded capitalist 
practices as few actually achieved international competitiveness (see Jomo, Felker and 
Rasiah, 1999). Engels had referred to the early merchant capitalists especially of the 17th 
Century as barbarians for whom plunder, piracy and pillage appeared more honorable 
than productive work. The entrepreneurs of the 17th Century gradually adapted their risk 
bearing and profit-making initiatives following developments in legal and civil 
institutions in Europe. Hence, business operations in developed Europe demonstrate far 
higher corporate and public accountability than in the developing economies. Rapid 
growth in social structures that have been both imperfect and underdeveloped has 
created a wide gap between dominant private interests and the masses in Southeast Asia.  
In the absence of sufficient civil and consumer rights, liberalization has been pursued 
blindly in circumstances of high incidence of market failure as well as government 
failure, which is a general tendency involving unfettered liberalization.  
 
Unlike the Brazilian, Mexican and Russian financial crises, which can be attributed 
primarily to public debt problems, the Southeast Asian financial crisis was caused by 
private debt problems. Claims of moral hazard arising from inadequate disclosures 
lacked sufficient empirical evidence. The default pressure and the problems faced by 
Indonesian, Malaysian, Filipino and Thai companies were primarily aggravated by 
private interests at the time of the crisis and served to meet private interests even when 
involving individuals whose responsibilities were public. Rising privatization since 
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1983-86 saw divestments driven through a patronage system where either private 
officials - connected to the state - or state officials accessing control themselves – owned 
much of the privatized projects. Governments in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
increasingly privatized profitable ventures, often understating their share values and 
offering considerable economic rents by limiting new entrants in related final markets. 
Large holding companies with political connections expanded into a whole range of 
public goods markets and shielded private goods markets even in spheres that were new 
to them. Without sufficient learning experience and sufficient levels of creative 
competition, these conglomerates produced and distributed products and services at sub-
optimal levels thereby exposing themselves to economic doom when faced with foreign 
competition. Holding companies in Malaysia were running up their debt in domestic 
banks without effective deepening of their fundamentals. Similar operations typified 
large domestic private interests in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand except they 
were increasingly accessing loans from abroad. 
 
Despite aggressive industrialization initiatives in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, 
none of the four economies have instituted the necessary instruments to stimulate 
industrial transition. The growing human capital and innovation deficits in these 
economies have continued to grow. Despite a massive expansion in institutions, 
Malaysia still lacks the requisite coordination mechanisms to help firms make the 
transition to higher value added activities. Revival efforts seem to reinforce the 
problems that confronted capability building prior to the crisis. The resurgence in capital 
inflows to East Asia and the stability offered by capital controls after September 2, 1998 
have merely revived capital supply to industry along the channels that were in place 
prior to the crisis.  The broad property sector, which was pointed out earlier as a major 
cause of the bubble - has become a major target of Danaharta.  The intensification of 
IMF-led liberalization in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand currently threatens to 
stall the conversion of latent capabilities to assist them realise their competitive 
advantage.  
 
Thailand still suffers from financial illiquidity problems as almost 50 percent of its 
banking sector remained non-performing in late 1999. Indonesia has been torn by 
political chaos so seriously that even the liquification of its financial system has not 
returned the country towards steady growth.  Insolvent banks were closed in Indonesia 
and Thailand. The Philippines did not suffer seriously from the crisis because of its low 
macroeconomic credentials. While recovery efforts in Malaysia have been more 
successful than the other crisis-affected Southeast Asian second tier NIEs, problems of 
public accountability still confront several directives. Bank mergers to ameliorate the 
financial sector problems still remain unresolved. The pre-crisis strategy of managing 
banking mergers involving over-exposed banks such as Bank Bumiputera with 
Commerce Bank and Sime Bank with Rashid Hussein Bank was extended to reduce the 
number of banks to six, and later expanded  to 10 anchor banks. That strategy hit a snag 
 13  
following complaints by several banks that the selection of anchor banks was not based 
on performance criteria.  
 
The masses were seriously affected by the sudden downswing in Indonesia, the  
Philippines and Thailand when unemployment and underemployment soared following 
closures (see Table 3). The IMF’s deregulatory strategies made the livelihoods of 
everyone more painful as deflationary prescriptions contracted these economies causing 
scarcity and job losses. These developments alongside poorly developed industrial 
relations and labor laws institutions exposed the workers to untold sufferings from 
oppressive labor-shedding, pay cuts and retrenchment practices. Democratisation in 
Thailand and Indonesia offered the working class and trade unions more room to voice 
their differences but their disorganised structures have restricted collective action. 
Moves in Thailand to integrate the seven national centres into a unified single center has 
yet to produce better institutional support for workers. In Indonesia, democratization did 
not translate into strong political support for working class leadership. Trade unions 
have remained a disjointed force in the Philippines with intense rivalries between them 
often favoring employers (see Rasiah and Chua, 1998). In Malaysia, the political 
manoeuvering that followed the financial crisis attracted the once independent labor 
movement in the country to the government. However, the Malaysian Trades Union 
Congress (MTUC) has failed to influence government policy.9 Typical of neo-liberal 
approaches – which call for the removal of rigidities that distort market clearing wage 
rates in labor markets - all the four economies remain without effective 
institutionalization of industrial relations practices.  The further liberalization of trade 
union policies, despite democratization in Indonesia and Thailand, is likely to expose 
workers to greater misery as external volatility rises. Such strategies will only strengthen 
the low road to industrialization or casualisation tendencies of unfettered liberalization.  
 
Structural Confusion 
 
With the exception of the Philippines, the Southeast Asian crisis-affected economies 
achieved rapid growth and low inflation and unemployment rates in the period 1986-96 
(see Table 4). However, growth was already slowing down by the mid-1990s because of 
growing deficits in technical change and productivity. In addition, the lack of 
development of the requisite institutional framework restricted the innovative 
capabilities necessary to sustain competitiveness. Malaysia enjoyed considerable 
expansion in physical infrastructure, but the institutions and co-ordination relationships 
necessary for firms to make the transition from low value added low wage production to 
high value added high wage production did not evolve adequately.  
 
 
9 While the past practice of dismissing crudely incisive suggestions by trade union leaders seems to have stopped, the 
government has yet to demonstrate a movement towards offering the labor movement space for social corporatism.  
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Financial institutions in the crisis-affected economies continued to expand their loans 
despite a slowdown in the real sectors in the period 1993-96.  Loans by the banking 
sector in Malaysia grew swiftly in the 1990s, though its foreign debt situation was more 
favorable than Thailand's, the Philippines' and Indonesia's (see Table 5). All four 
economies’ gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) continued to grow faster than GDP 
(see Rasiah, 1998a), pushing their incremental capital output ratios higher and higher 
without commensurate productivity increments (see Table 5),10 supporting the assertion 
that growth was driven by inputs and factors of production more rather than by 
disembodied technical change. A combination of government promotion and growing 
confidence in the private sector attracted investments beyond optimal levels so that the 
nominal returns continued to rise instead of diminishing. Much of the loans in Malaysia 
were drawn from local financial institutions or through foreign funds deposited 
domestically. However, the build up of foreign loans in Malaysia was rising sharply in 
the mid-1990s so it could easily have exceeded its international reserves had the crash 
been delayed by two years. International claims involving Malaysia that were held by 
foreign banks rose from US$16.8 billion at the end of 1995 to US$28.8 billion by mid 
1997, though, it was much smaller than those of Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea 
and Thailand (Radelet and Sachs, 1998: Table 5). The private sector's share of such 
foreign banks’ claims of Malaysia rose from 67.5 percent at the end of 1995 to 93.4 per 
cent in mid-1997.11 All four economies faced expansionary banking policies in the 
1990s, which, given the slowdown in the real sectors of manufacturing and agriculture, 
bloated the bubble. The easy expansion of credit especially in the 1990s raised the 
loans/equity ratios to extremely high levels. The collapse in currency and share values 
aggravated the imbalances further.   
 
Malaysia had the worst loans/GDP ratio when the financial crisis struck. Domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector as a share of GDP in Malaysia had risen from 77.9 
percent in 1990 to 166.6 percent in 1997 (World Bank, 1999: Table 16). The 
commensurate percentages for the other crisis affecting Southeast Asian economies were 
much smaller: Indonesia – 45.5 percent in 1990 and 54.3 percent in 1997, the 
Philippines – 26.8 percent in 1990 and 83.4 percent in 1997 and Thailand – 90.8 percent 
in 1990 and 124.3 percent in 1997. Nevertheless, the bubble in Malaysia was easier to 
handle as the bulk of the loans was domestically denominated compared to loans in 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, which were primarily from abroad, and hence 
the need to seek IMF redress. 
 
 
 
10 Nevertheless, considering the early stage of growth and rapid structural change, capital and total factor productivity 
measures should not be a major source of alarm as it is generally associated with large intial outlays of lumpy investments. 
11  Computed from Radelet and Sachs (1998: Table 5) 
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Table 612: Debt Service and Short-term Debt, 1980-96 
Debt Service as a 
proportion of exports 
(%) 
Short-term Debt (Billion US$)# Current Account Deficit Plus 
Short-term Debt as 
Proportion of International 
Reserves (%)* 
 
1980 1992 1995 1992 1994 1995 1996 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Indonesia 13.9 32.1 30.9 18.2 14.0 16.2 17.9 191 139 169 138 
Malaysia   6.3   6.6   7.8   3.6   7.6   7.5   8.5   29   46   60   55 
Philippines 26.6 27.7 16.0   4.4   9.7 11.0 12.0 100 212 203 149 
South Korea - - - - - - - - - - 251 
Thailand 18.9 14.1 10.2 14.7 29.2 41.1 44.0 101 127 152 153 
 
Sources: UNCTAD (I 997: Table 14); World Bank (I 994: Tables 20, 23, 1997: Table 17). 
 
The rising tide of liberalization in all four economies from the mid-1980s, which, given 
their domestic political structures, magnified crony privatization. Privatization initiatives 
guided by neo-liberal consultants from the West magnified in scale as a consequence.  
The private sector's role in allocation and co-ordination, either through opaque crony 
alliances or via banking, finance and stock market expansion, became dominant. Hence, 
when governments began divesting shares of public companies the allocation procedures 
followed patronage lines, polarising wealth distribution as a consequence; the Gini 
coefficient of income inequality in Malaysia worsened from 1990 to 1995 (see Rasiah 
and Ishak, forthcoming). The excesses did not seem overly draining in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s due to rapid growth and the consequently widespread rent-generating 
opportunities. When the real sectors began slowing down from 1993-96, shrinking rents 
and unsustainable expenditures involving mega projects began to undermine 
profitability. Contrary to neo-liberal references to privatization in these economies to be 
state-driven or dirigiste reference to them as being dictated by private sector initiatives, 
private interests working hand in hand with the politically powerful began to dominate 
the financially profitable but rentier activities. In the absence of normal risk bearing 
requirements - as several ventures enjoyed state guarantees of domestic market control - 
a significant section of the newly created business class hardly showed critical elements 
of productive capitalism. 13
 
Unproductive ventures, including property and share purchasers, attracted financing 
from banks and other financial institutions which, given their huge assets in the 1990s, 
 
12 Year end figures as percentage of reserves measured by dividing the current account deficit plus short-term debt by 
international reserves (1992 figures computed from World Bank data 
13 The central mechanism of industrial capitalism as argued by Marx (1962) and re-emphasised by Brenner (1982) is the 
approaporiation of relative surplus value to ensure the renewal and transformation of the means of production. Marx 
considered competition as important in forcing old modes of technology to give way to new ones. Schumpeter (1934) 
echoed these points when referring to competition as having the “gales of creative destruction”. 
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launched aggressive lending strategies.14 Dominant private interests with political 
connections enjoyed considerable support from the government in all the four 
economies in the property and real sectors. Colossal losses – e.g. Perwaja Steel in 
Malaysia, double floor highway in Thailand and Timur-Kia venture in Indonesia – did 
not force the introduction of better corporate practices. In addition, while a number of 
the mega projects of governments can be argued to contain potential ammunition for 
substantial multiplier effects, the lack of effective screening and reliance on patronage 
rather than proven productive entrepreneurship to award contracts saw the failure of 
several. Private banks and finance companies facing liberal regulations began to extend 
loans based on quick returns, collateral and links with powerful politicians.15 All the four 
economies showed a fall in loans to the agricultural, manufacturing and trade sectors 
between the years 1990-96 (see Table 7). The share of loans to construction, finance and 
real sector and service and household sectors expanded.  
 
Table 6: Loans and Advances by Commercial Banks, 1990-96 (%) 
 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand  
1990 1996 1990 1996 1990 1996 1990 1996 
Agriculture   9.0   6.0   6.4   2.4 13.8   6.5   6.2   3.5 
Manufacturing 35.0 27.0 21.3 22.0 38.5 32.3 23.7 23.1 
Construction   -   -   7.0   8.9   2.7   3.9   3.8   4.1 
Trade and  
Tranportation 
34.0 24.0 16.5 12.1 18.2 22.2 25.5 21.7 
Finance and  
Real estate 
  -   - 39.5 39.2 16.9 21.8 19.2 21.5 
Service Industr 18.0 31.0   -   -   -   -   -   - 
Households   -   -   2.4   3.7   -   - 13.8 16.3 
Others   3.0 11.0   6.9 11.8 10.0 13.3   7.9   9.7 
Source: ADB (1999) 
 
While industrial policy equipped the first-tier Asian NIEs with strong institutional 
support for driving technical change, it has yet to do so in the crisis-affected Southeast 
Asian economies. Singapore successfully developed and maintained the institutions 
necessary to sustain its leading role as the Southeast Asian regional hub for medium to 
high technology-intensive production and services. South Korea and Taiwan 
successfully developed the necessary institutions to not only speed up the absorption and 
development of technologies, but also to strengthen their capacity to support new 
product development (see Lall, 1996). Excessive credit expansion and the lack of 
accountable supervision sowed the seeds for the financial crisis in 1997, but glacial (Jeg 
 
14 Interviews by author with a Vice President of a local commercial bank in 1998. 
15 Interviews by author with a Vice President of a local commercial bank in 1998. 
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kan ikke gennemskue meningen med denne sætning) deepening in the real sectors had 
already slowed down Southeast Asia’s crisis-affected economies’ growth potential (see 
Rasiah, 1998a).  With the exception of resource based industries, such as palm oil 
processing, much of the manufacturing firms in Malaysia have yet to go beyond OEM 
capabilities, and does not have the institutions to adequately generate the requisite 
human and other technological capabilities to support rapid technical change. With the 
exception of food processing and jewelry, Thailand is plagued with the same problems. 
Indonesia has yet to develop any viable manufacturing industry despite its grip on over 
50 percent of the world’s plywood market. The little semblance of industrial policy 
during the Marcos’ government, albeit implemented unproductively, disappeared since 
the mid-1980s.  
 
The lack of institutional deepening to sustain efficiency improvements seriously 
restricted the performance of real sector firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand. Malaysia embarked on ambitious programmes to ameliorate these gaps 
but coordination problems has debilitated such efforts (see Rasiah, 1999). Burgeoning 
trade imbalances, high import shares in domestic demand and heavy concentration of 
production in narrowly defined segments of product chains threatens to inhibit further 
structural change in Malaysia and Thailand. Indonesia and the Philippines still face 
serious demand constraints, which is why their unemployment and underemployment 
rates soared to 11-18 percent and 40-50 percent respectively in 1997-99. Malaysia was 
at the crossroads at the time the financial crisis struck with its supply-side resources such 
as labor and infrastructure services overheating. The over-reliance on labor-intensive 
foreign capital in the face of supply-side constraints attracted foreign labor substitution, 
thereby slowing down the transition to higher skill and technology stages of production 
in Malaysia. Foreign labor substituted around 15-25 percent of the labor force of around 
9 million in 1997. Because the emphasis in these economies were on meeting rather than 
managing market demand to enhance labor, employment strategies were generally 
decoupled from job permanence and skills enrichment. The deregulated labor market in 
Philippines without adequate developments in social welfare frameworks has 
increasingly expanded the share of casualised labor in the labor force (see Rasiah and 
Chua, 1998). 
  
Policies to support local and indigenous firms across the crisis-affected Southeast Asian 
economies have still to materialise on the global stage as these firms are still primarily 
rent-dependent. While it is still early to predict the future of these economies, the 
admission of China into WTO may stimulate a major slowdown in FDI inflows as its 
labor reserves reaches around three times that of Southeast Asia.  The recovery in global 
demand has helped revive foreign-owned export-oriented industries in all of them, 
though the prime beneficiary is Malaysia.  Electronics in particular has picked up 
strongly from early 1999. With the fallen values of domestic currencies, these 
economies have become competitive again in low wage activities. In Malaysia, the 
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Industrial Production Index (IPI) grew by 8.9 percent with manufacturing recording a 
growth of 12.7 percent in the period 1998-99 (New Straits Times, February 10, 2000: 
22). Domestically shielded industries such as cars have also begun to grow rapidly, but 
these industries have not expanded their export shares, suggesting that they are still 
heavily rent-dependent. However, unless the technological architecture of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand changes to support industrial upgrading, the 
second wind offered by currency depreciation could easily be wasted as relative costs 
rise and new sites become more attractive.  
 
The Southeast Asian crisis-affected economies’ exposure to the financial whirlpool 
could have been made less painful if only they had in place effective controls to prevent 
the sudden exit and entry of large amounts of capital. Good corporate practices would 
have strengthened the capacity of firms and institutions to ward off systemic 
disturbances. Also, the slowdown in the real sectors and the gradual build up in current 
account deficits could have been avoided if these economies had developed the requisite 
institutions effectively. In the absence of these conditions, the crisis-affected Southeast 
Asian economies became easy prey to the inherent disturbances of an increasingly 
unguarded international economy. Instead of recognising these flaws, neo-liberal 
economists seem to focus their attention on resource misallocation, cronyism and 
corruption. Clearly both initiatives – IMF-based liberalization and Malaysia’s capital 
controls – have not departed from the fundamental flaws associated with? poorly 
governed capitalist growth.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper examined the fundamental neo-liberal flaws that caused the financial rupture. 
While making the argument that the harmful waves of increasingly free global currency 
and capital markets exposed these economies to tremendous systemic volatilities and 
hence was the prime cause of the financial crisis, the paper also argued that porous 
governance instruments as well as pursuance of privatization and business deals colored 
by patronage were driven by the dominant interest groups globally and nationally. Rapid 
growth was not accompanied by the strengthening of civil and legal rights and hence as 
the liberal waves became turbulent these economies easily capsized. IMF rescue 
packages initially aggravated the socio-economic conditions of Indonesia and Thailand 
as deflationary currents contracted these economies. Malaysia’s capital controls offered 
shields as well as spurred investment with low interest rates and easier access to credit, 
though it merely reproduced the problems associated with pre-crisis patronage-based 
accumulation. 
 
The Southeast Asian financial crisis was the result of both increasingly liberalising 
currents as well as government policies that were equally exposing the domestic 
economy to the vicissitudes of external volatility. All four affected governments were 
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actually peddling privatization and liberalization initiatives that favored the interests of 
politically connected dominant groups. Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia 
succumbed to IMF pressures because of their overblown international commitments. 
Malaysia escaped such humiliation only because it enjoyed a relative surplus in 
international reserves. 
 
It is clear that free currency and capital markets exposed the crisis-affected Southeast 
Asian economies to substantial systemic risks, destabilising them seriously when 
external volatility suddenly exploded. Despite a creeping slowdown, these economies 
were not expected to crash suddenly. While a major lesson to emerge from the Southeast 
Asian financial crisis is the need to institute regulation in the international financial 
system, the damage inflicted by the crisis could have been reduced if the requisite 
shields were in place. Malaysia’s capital control efforts did not generate any apparent 
disastrous effects, though it could have been more successful if introduced in late 1997 
and if it had been accompanied by strong emphasis on public accountability and 
transparency. The introduction of capital controls behind opaque rules suggests the 
continued pursuance of pre-crisis unproductive patronage arrangements designed to 
maintain the pre-crisis hegemony of the ruling elites and politically connected dominant 
interest groups.  
 
Democratization without effective legal and civil instruments has prevented the 
strengthening of public accountability in Indonesia and Thailand, which is likely to 
reproduce disjointed structures of mass organisations as seen in the Philippines. The lack 
of democratization along with a draconian civil and legal framework has left Malaysia 
still without an adequate framework to ensure improvements in public accountability.  
Authoritarian regimes under pressure – whether from domestic or international forces – 
have often used nationalism cavalierly to gain currency for their own survival. While in 
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines (since Marcos in the mid-1980s) the advent of 
unguarded and populist liberalization was leaving them open to potentially dangerous 
international forces, in Malaysia the lack of democratization has deepened further 
compromises on freedom, social accountability and justice. Yet, none of the regimes 
have delinked from mainstream neo-liberal policies. Despite the introduction of capital 
controls, government policies in Malaysia generally favored politically connected 
private interests. The Malaysian domestic economy is also strongly powered by FDI, 
and the government’s strong interest in foreign portfolio equity capital can be seen from 
the modest exit tax remaining in the stock market. It is only when international interests 
contradicted and destabilised the interests of the ruling elites and when it was threatened 
with collapse following the financial rupture that the government took drastic measures 
to shield them.  
 
The Southeast Asian crisis affected economies nature of government interventions 
generally worked hand in hand with dominant private interests so that the short-term 
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profit-making benefits of liberalization were strongly promoted. While liberal currency 
and capital markets left these economies unguarded against turbulent capital movements 
and hence was the cause of the sudden crash, cronyism and corruption made matters 
worse. Yet, cronyism and corruption emerged largely as a consequence of the lack of 
development in civil and legal rights to improve public accountability, elements that are 
inherently part of unfettered deregulation.  
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